Perception is a powerful force and right now it is running against Prada. The Louis Vuitton Cup is only a few races old and already the impression of Patrizio Bertelli's team is of an embattled outfit.

Remember this was the top challenger in 1999/2000 who sailed Team New Zealand in the 30th America's Cup match. Advancing one stage further this time was always going to be a far more arduous task.

Which is why Prada embarked on the strategy they did and why, ironically, it may act against them in the coming weeks. As Challenger of Record, Prada exerted maximum leverage to shape the challenger trials in a way it thought would suit its own best interest. That's why there is a month's gap between the conclusion of the Louis Vuitton Cup and 31st America's Cup so that the winner has sufficient time to recover from racing and resume serious speed development.

And it is also why the trials heavily benefit the top four, (and later the top two), teams as they advance automatically from the quarter and semi-finals whilst the lower qualifiers have to race an extra eight days in each of the repecharge rounds. That means more development time and fewer race days burning up quota-limited sails for the top teams; the reverse for the others.

Before the Louis Vuitton Cup started, you would have found few takers for a bet placing Prada outside the top four. Now they might become a victim of their own trials system, behind in their battle plan and fighting to get it back on track.

The Prada strategy for the follow-on campaign was do everything possible to produce a fast boat and address perceived weaknesses in the sailing team. Operations boss Laurent Esquier made a big play to hire Kiwi Gavin Brady. At the time, Paul Cayard was still a senior executive figure at Oracle BMW, and delighted in telling anyone who was interested to say just how much Prada bid for Brady. It was serious money.

Likewise, handsome bounties were offered for the design team. Prada tried hiring Bruce Farr, having already bought his Young America boats, but Larry Ellison's Oracle BMW made sure it was they won that contest, not the Italians. Doug Peterson stayed on, along with CFD specialist Dave Egan with whom he'd worked at Team New Zealand in 1995. Replacing German Frers were Englishman Ian Howlett and Argentine Juan Kouyoymadjian, both with reputations for progressive solutions in filleting rating rules.

The rights and wrongs of Brady and Peterson's fall from grace don't matter. The fact that it happened means that fissures opened up inside the team that the management could not fix. Couple that with a strategy to build the second boat late to maximise design R & D time now leaves Prada dealing with personnel and performance issues whilst trying to earn points in races.

Failure to be in the top four and getting involved in the messy repecharge could see Prada skewered by a system of their own creation. Logically, with all their accumulated experience, Prada should have wherewithal to turn things around. But last time Prada's only two true rivals flattered to deceive. Paul Cayard's AmericaOne had too little money, too late, and Young America was as fragile in its personnel as its boats proved to be.

This time, Alinghi, OneWorld and Oracle BMW have already proved their potential leaving Prada pincered between the A list tycoon teams and the messy mid-field players. Not a nice situation and certainly not one Prada expected to be in.
Tim Jeffery, 5 October 2002